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The Growth Management Act of 1990 (GMA) mandated
the most sweeping revisions to the regulation of real property
rights in Washington State history.' Twenty-six counties and
one hundred eighty cities are currently in the process of
redrafting their comprehensive plans, adopting ordinances to
protect the targeted values of resource lands and critical areas,
and revising their zoning codes in order to comply with the
GMA.2
Courts indulge in a "usual assumption that . . . [such
changes are] simply 'adjusting the benefits and burdens of eco-
nomic life' in a manner that secures an 'average reciprocity of
advantage' to everyone concerned."3 Such "average reciprocity
of advantage" occurs more easily in legal theory than in real-
ity, however. It is inevitable that for some property owners,
the result of all this "reregulation" will be that their land can-
not be used as they had reasonably expected, and investments
in land that they have reasonably made, in some instances over
many years, will be rendered of little or no value. Thus, now
more than ever, the issue will be tested of whether the consti-
tutional rights to be free of uncompensated taking of property
* Elaine Spencer is a partner at Bogle & Gates, Seattle, Washington, where she
practices trial and administrative work in land use, forest practices, water rights,
Indian treaty rights, and constitutional law. B.S. 1971, Iowa State University; J.D.
1976, Yale University Law School.
1. 1990 Wash. Laws 1972, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 17 (amended by 1991 Wash. Laws 2903,
1st Sp. Sess., ch. 32 and 1992 Wash. Laws 1050, ch. 227) (codified at WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. ch. 36.70A (West 1991 & Supp. 1993), WASH. REV. CODE ANN. ch. 47.80 (West
Supp. 1993), and WASH. REV. CODE ANN. ch. 82.02 (West 1991 & Supp. 1993)).
2. WASHINGTON DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT STATUS REPORT,
How GROWTH MANAGEMENT IS WORKING (Feb. 1993).
3. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2894 (1992) (quoting
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)) (citations omitted).
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and to substantive due process offer real-world protection to
property owners.
Although the Fifth Amendment has traditionally barred a
state's physical occupation of property and not merely a regu-
lation of the property's use, the general rule is that if regula-
tion goes too far, it will be recognized as a taking.4 Protection
from regulation that goes too far will have real-life value only
if the courts find a way to give meaning to the United States
Supreme Court's statement that the Fifth Amendment Tak-
ings Clause protects a citizen's "distinct investment-backed
expectations" from being frustrated for the public good.'
As the courts have repeatedly said, takings cases are
intensely factual and each case will turn on its own individual
facts.6 Thus, the courts will continue to reject facial challenges
to regulations on takings grounds unless it is clear from the
face of a particular regulation that it deprives an owner of all
viable economic use of its property or that the ordinance does
not substantially advance legitimate state interests. That will
rarely be the case.7 Furthermore, the courts will continue to
require that all possible administrative remedies be
exhausted.' Thus, although broad classes of potentially injured
parties can be identified, the prospects for challenging any zon-
ing regulation on its face are so dismal that the right to be free
from an uncompensated taking regulation must nearly always
be vindicated, if at all, through individual litigation rather than
by a class. The sheer cost of the litigation, added to the cost of
meeting the judicial mandate of exhaustion of administrative
remedies, will leave many plaintiffs with meritorious claims
without a remedy.
4. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415.
5. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
6. Specifically, the Court has stated as follows:
[The Supreme] Court, quite simply, has been unable to develop any "set
formula" for determining when "justice and fairness" require that economic
injuries caused by public action be compensated by the government, rather
than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons. Indeed, [the
Court has] frequently observed that whether a particular restriction will be
rendered invalid by the government's failure to pay for any losses proximately
caused by it depends largely "upon the particular circumstances [in that]
case".
Id. (quoting United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958))
(alteration in original; citations omitted).
7. See Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
8. See MacDonald, Somner & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340 (1986);
Williamson County Regional Planning v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
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In addition to interpreting the Fifth Amendment, Wash-
ington courts have increasingly looked to principles of substan-
tive due process to protect private property rights. Although
largely ignored by federal courts since the Depression, substan-
tive due process has been a major alternative theory in five
recent Washington Supreme Court cases,9 and it promises to
figure significantly in the future.
Currently, Washington is far enough along in the imple-
mentation of the GMA that the factual outlines of many future
cases can be identified. This Article examines some of the
most frequent factual patterns of dashed expectations under
the GMA and attempts to predict, in light of both the law as it
has developed over the last fifteen years and the very recent
cases, where the constitutional lines should be drawn. Section
I briefly discusses the basic principles of takings law as enunci-
ated by prior cases, as well as the United States Supreme
Court's recent decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council,'° and the Washington Supreme Court's recent deci-
sions in Sintra, Inc. v. Seattle1 and Robinson v. Seattle.2
Although the Lucas decision has received considerable public-
ity, it advanced the state of the law rather little. The real gui-
dance for future decisions arising out of the GMA will come
from earlier United States Supreme Court decisions and the
Washington Supreme Court's decisions in Sintra, Robinson,
and Lutheran Day Care v. Snohomish County.1 3
Section II introduces several hypothetical situations based
on actual property owners with whom the Author is familiar.
It examines how those hypothetical situations would be treated
under an application of the law as it exists today. The Article
concludes that although many truly injured parties will them-
selves be exhausted by the duty to exhaust administrative rem-
edies, the law will protect the reasonable investment-backed
expectations of those landowners who survive the administra-
tive hurdles. It further concludes that public interest would be
9. Guimont v. Clarke, 121 Wash. 2d 586, 854 P.2d 1 (1993); Sintra, Inc. v. Seattle,
119 Wash. 2d 1, 829 P.2d 765, cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 676 (1992); Robinson v. Seattle, 119
Wash. 2d 34, 830 P.2d 318, cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 676 (1992); Lutheran Day Care v.
Snohomish County, 119 Wash. 2d 91, 829 P.2d 746 (1992), cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 1044
(1993); Presbytery of Seattle v. King County, 114 Wash. 2d 320, 787 P.2d 907, cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 284 (1990).
10. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
11. 119 Wash. 2d 1, 829 P.2d 765, cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 676 (1992).
12. 119 Wash. 2d 34, 830 P.2d 318, cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 676 (1992).
13. 119 Wash. 2d 91, 829 P.2d 746 (1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1044 (1993).
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better served by a greater recognition of property rights at the
stage of ordinance development and permitting, as well as by
legislation, to both reduce the burden of exhausting adminstra-
tive remedies and the potential size of damage awards where a
taking or a violation of substantive due process rights has
occurred.
I. THE EXISTING CASE LAW: SUGGESTIONS OF THE FUTURE,
BUT Too LrrrLE THAT IS CONCRETE
In most areas one can look to the case law and find reason-
ably clear guidance for future decisions. This is less true in the
field of regulatory takings and property rights than in other
fields for a number of reasons. First, the United States
Supreme Court has sought every reason possible not to decide
most of the cases it has even agreed to consider.14 Second,
many of its pronouncements concerning what would violate
the Constitution are found in dicta in cases holding against the
property owner.15 Third, the only square holdings in favor of
property owners have come in cases of either actual physical
invasion' 6 or of complete loss of use of an entire property. 7
This scenario is rare, and if it forms the only basis for constitu-
14. See Yee v. Escondido, 112 S. Ct. 1522 (1992) (stating that the issue was not
properly presented in petition for writ of certiori); MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v.
Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340 (1986) (holding that the property owner could have applied
for a less dense development); Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v.
Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985) (holding that the property owner failed to exhaust
administrative remedies); San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621
(1981) (holding that the decision appealed from was not a final judgment); Agins v.
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (stating that the owner had not obtained a final decision
on the use of its property).
15. See Agins, 447 U.S. at 260 ("The application of a general zoning law to
particular property effects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially advance
legitimate state interests, or denies an owner economically viable use of his land.")
(citations omitted); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124
(1978) ("Whether a particular restriction will be rendered invalid by the government's
failure to pay for any losses proximately caused by it depends largely 'upon the
particular circumstances [in that] case.' ") (quoting United States v. Central Eureka
Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958)) (alteration in original).
16. See Lucas v. Southern Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992) (holding
that two residential lots rendered useable for nothing more than camping in a tent was
a taking); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304
(1987) (holding that prohibiting the use of the entire church camp was a taking).
17. See Nolan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (holding that
imposing a beach access easement as a condition of construction of a house was a
taking); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (holding
that imposing obligation to permit cable TV wires to be strung on building was a
taking); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (holding that imposing right
of public access on privately created marina was a taking).
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tional protection of property rights, the Fifth Amendment's
protection from uncompensated taking is of little value in the
regulatory context.
The United States Supreme Court handed down one regu-
latory takings case in its October 1991 term, Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council.'" In spite of the fanfare awaiting
Lucas, it advanced the state of the law very little. Its principal
value in predicting decisions under the GMA is found in dicta
and by implication, with all the risks and uncertainties inher-
ent in relying on dicta or implied decisions. Therefore, earlier
cases such as Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York
City, 9 Nolan v. California Coastal Commission,2' and First
English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Ange-
les2 remain the backbone of federal takings law.
Washington courts have been quite active in the area of
takings law, and it may be that Washington State law has
eclipsed federal law in the area of protection of property rights
from excessive regulations. In May 1992, the Washington State
Supreme Court decided three land use regulation cases raising
both takings and substantive due process issues: Sintra, Inc. v.
Seattle,2 Robinson v. Seattle,23 and Lutheran Day Care v. Sno-
homish County.24 These cases are more dramatic in their hold-
ings than the Lucas case, and their analysis appears more
significant because the Washington court was willing to
examine market realities and the effects of delay in a way that
the United States Supreme Court never has. Because Wash-
ington cases contain egregious and unusual facts, however, it
remains to be seen whether they will have significant impact
on more typical regulatory cases.
In many ways, Penn Central remains the quintessential
case concerning the protection of investment-backed expecta-
tions. Penn Central Railroad opened Grand Central Terminal
in New York in 1913.25 It is conceded to be a great building
architecturally and from the standpoint of the engineering
18. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
19. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
20. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
21. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
22. 119 Wash. 2d 1, 829 P.2d 765, cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 676 (1992).
23. 119 Wash. 2d 34, 830 P.2d 318, cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 676 (1992).
24. 119 Wash. 2d 91, 829 P.2d 746 (1992), cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 1044 (1993).
25. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 115.
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solution it embodies.26 It is a fine railroad terminal, but by the
mid-1960s it was an eight-story structure sandwiched between
high-rise towers and a significant underutilization of its site.'
Penn Central was by then in bankruptcy with a serious need to
maximize the value of all of its assets. To do so, in 1968 it
entered into an agreement with a developer under which the
developer agreed to pay Penn Central one million dollars
annually during construction and at least three million dollars
annually for fifty years thereafter, and, in exchange, the devel-
oper would construct a fifty-five-story office tower to be can-
tilevered over Grand Central Station.2" That agreement was
quashed, however, by New York's Landmarks Preservation
Commission, which found the plan to be aesthetically in con-
flict with the building's status as a historic landmark.'
Penn Central claimed that its property had been "taken"
in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. s° In a
six to three decision, the United States Supreme Court dis-
agreed."1 The Court pointed out that a material part of its
inquiry in the case was "the extent to which the regulation has
interfered with [the owner's] distinct investment-backed expec-
tations."' 2 It found determinative the fact that Grand Central
was conceded to still be a well-functioning train station-the
use for which Penn Central purchased the land-upon which
Penn Central would still make a reasonable return.' The fact
that one element of what Penn Central considered to be the
value of its property was destroyed, or at least devalued, was
viewed as being irrelevant, so long as the basic purpose for
which the property had been purchased remained viable.'
The Court made clear, however, that a very different case
would be presented if Penn Central were functionally or eco-
26. Id. at 116 n.16.
27. Id. at 115.
28. Id. at 116.
29. Id at 117-18.
30. Id. at 107.
31. Then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice William Rehnquist, wrote the
dissent, which remains one of the ringing calls for a broad and liberal interpretation of
the Fifth Amendment to preserve property rights. Unfortunately, it was the dissent.
Although Justice Rehnquist joined the majority in Lucas, there is no reason to believe
that the majority would go so far as to overturn Penn Central if presented with the
occasion today.
32. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
33. Id. at 129, 136, 138 n.36.
34. Id. at 130.
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nomically no longer usable. 5 If Penn Central could no longer
utilize the property for the purpose of which it was acquired,
the Court appeared willing to grant Penn Central relief.3 6
In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,37 the United
States Supreme Court reversed the South Carolina Supreme
Court's decision, which had held that even if the state's coastal
regulation deprived Lucas of all economically viable use of his
property, it did not constitute a taking where Lucas had not
shown that the regulations did not advance an important pub-
lic purpose. In doing so, the Supreme Court seems to have
once and for all put to rest one surprisingly recurring issue:
whether a worthy public purpose is sufficient to insulate a reg-
ulation from being a taking."8 It held that where a property
owner is deprived of all economically viable use of his land, a
regulation is not insulated from the Takings Clause by a wor-
thy public purpose, including the purpose of preventing harm
to an important public resource.3 9 Only if the proposed use
that the regulation seeks to prevent could have been prohib-
ited under the state's common law of nuisance or similar doc-
trines, can it be prohibited without compensation where the
owner is left with no viable economic use.40 The Court's
35. Id. at 138 n.36.
36. The Court's final comment was as follows:
We emphasize that our holding today is on the present record, which in turn
is based on Penn Central's present ability to use the Terminal for its intended
purposes and in a gainful fashion. The city conceded at oral argument that if
appellants can demonstrate at some point in the future that circumstances
have so changed that the Terminal ceases to be "economically viable,"
appellants may obtain relief.
Id. at 138 n.36. Although it was the city's "concession," not the Court's, there is no
reason for the Court to have emphasized the point or reported the city's concession if
the Court did not agree.
37. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
38. The Washington cases follow a similar vein. In Allingham v. Seattle, 109
Wash. 2d 947, 749 P.2d 160 (1988), overruled in part by Presbytery of Seattle v. King
County, 114 Wash. 2d 320, 787 P.2d 907 (1990), the City of Seattle argued that
preservation of greenbelts was essential to the future well-being of the City of Seattle
and therefore the City's Greenbelt Ordinance could not be a taking. The Washington
Supreme Court conceded the virtue of preserving greenbelts but held that it did not
justify taking them without compensation. In Sintra, Inc. v. Seattle, 119 Wash. 2d 1,
829 P.2d 765, cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 676 (1992) and Robinson v. Seattle, 119 Wash. 2d
34, 830 P.2d 318, cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 676 (1992), the City argued that preventing a
loss of low-income housing was a worthy social goal, which should keep the City's
actions from constituting a taking or a deprivation of substantive due process. The
Washington Supreme Court, again, disagreed.
39. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2895.
40. Id. at 2900. The Washington Supreme Court came to a somewhat similar
conclusion in Sintra, and in doing so backed away from language in Presbytery v. King
1230 University of Puget Sound Law Review [Vol. 16:1223
rationale was that where common law principles of nuisance
could have prohibited the use of the property in question, that
use was never part of the owner's title to the property and
thus cannot logically now be "taken.941
That this issue was even in question was surprising in light
of the Court's prior decisions. As early as Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon,' Justice Holmes said in invalidating a Penn-
sylvania statute designed to prevent private homes from falling
into pits created by subsidence (the prevention of a public
harm at least as great as that in question in Lucas): "The pro-
tection of private property in the Fifth Amendment presup-
poses that it is wanted for public use, but provides that it shall
not be taken for such use without compensation.... We are in
danger of forgetting that a strong public desire to improve the
County, 114 Wash. 2d 320, 787 P.2d 907, cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 284 (1990), which, if it
ever were good law, quite clearly is good law no longer.
In Presbytery, the court set up a threshold inquiry for any takings claim: whether
the measure merely safeguarded the public interest, or went further, to "enhance a
publicly owned right in property." Id. at 329, 787 P.2d at 914. Only if it did the latter,
said the court, could the measure constitute a taking, no matter what its economic
impact might be. In Sintra, the court explained its analysis in Presbytery as really
being only a way of saying that cities can prohibit "nuisance-like activity" without
paying compensation. Sintra, 119 Wash. 2d at 15-16, 829 P.2d at 773. Conceptually, the
notion that a measure could only be a taking if it "enhanced a publicly owned right in
property" is far more limiting than simply not being a nuisance. There never was any
decisional support for the court's formulations of its threshold inquiry in Presbytery.
In Guimont v. Clarke, 121 Wash. 2d 586, 854 P.2d 1 (1993), the Washington court
"reordered" its analysis in Presbytery to take Lucas into account. Id at 598-604, 854
P.2d at 8-11. But see Powers v. Skagit County, 67 Wash. App. 180, 835 P.2d 230 (1992),
where the Washington State Court of Appeals attempted to reconcile Presbytery with
Lucas by concluding that Lucas created a "pre-threshold" inquiry, to be followed by
the full Presbytery analysis. Id. at 190, 835 P.2d at 236. The concurring decision was
probably correct in suggesting that Lucas requires a complete rethinking of that
portion of Presbytery, at least where the owner is left with no economically viable use
of its land. Id. at 195-96, 835 P.2d at 239 (Grosse, C.J., concurring).
41. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2901. The Court's reasoning is essentially identical to that
used by the Washington Supreme Court in Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 747
P.2d 1062 (1987), cert denied, 486 U.S. 1022 (1988) ("Orion II"), to limit the uses that
could be "taken" from an owner of tidelands by the Shorelines Management Act to
those uses that could not have been prescribed by the pre-existing public trust doctrine
applicable to state shorelines and tidelands. "[O]rion had no right to make any use of
its property that would substantially impair the public rights of navigation and
fishing.... Orion never had the right to dredge and fill its tidelands, either for a
residential community or farmlands. Since a 'property right must exist before it can
be taken,' neither the SMA nor the SCSMMP effected a taking by prohibiting Orion's
dredge and fill project." Id. at 641-42, 747 P.2d at 1073 (citations omitted). The U.S.
Supreme Court would almost undoubtedly expand its exemption from takings liability
to include the public trust doctrine as well as traditional nuisance doctrine. Thus,
Lucas probably has no impact on the continuing validity of Orion.
42. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
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public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire
by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the
change."4 In short, a worthy public purpose is presumed to be
present any time the state takes property. If not, the state can-
not take the property at all.4 4 The existence of a public pur-
pose, however, does not excuse the obligation to pay for what it
takes. There is no more justification for an uncompensated
taking by regulation, just because the purpose is worthy, than
there would be for an uncompensated taking of any other kind.
More recently, in Nolan v. California Coastal Commis-
sion,45 Justice Scalia made clear that to avoid a taking, a land
use regulation must both substantially advance legitimate state
interests and not deny an owner the economically viable use of
his land.46 In light of those clear dual requirements, it is sur-
prising that anyone thought that Lucas needed to show both
that all viable use of his property was destroyed and that the
law did not serve worthy purposes.4?
South Carolina's argument, however, was that there was a
different rule when the worthy public purpose was preventing
a public harm rather than promoting the public good.48 The
"harm" in this case was ostensibly preventing beach erosion.
In Lucas, Justice Scalia aptly pointed out that whether a pro-
posal "prevents a public harm" or "creates a public benefit"
depends mostly on the eye of the beholder.49 Virtually any
proposal can be described as either. Were the Court to rule
that a proposal that "prevented public harm" was exempt from
takings analysis, the public attorneys charged with drafting
such legislation would simply take care to include in the pre-
43. Id. at 415-416 (citations omitted; emphasis added).
44. See In re Seattle, 96 Wash. 2d 616, 638 P.2d 549 (1981) (holding that the City of
Seattle could not condemn land for its proposed Westlake Mall project because the
taking was not for a public use). "In order for a purposed condemnation to meet the
requirement of Const. art. 1, § 16, the court must find (1) that the use is really public,
(2) that the public interests require it, and (3) that the property appropriated is
necessary for the purpose." Id. at 625, 638 P.2d at 555.
45. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
46. Id. at 834.
47. The Lucas majority dealt harshly with Justice Blackmun's dissenting
argument that proof that a regulation does not deprive all economic use would defeat a
taking claim, but proof that it does deprive all economic use would not alone establish
a taking claim. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893 n.6.
48. Id. at 2896. Under that rationale, one wonders if a city could take property for
a police or fire station without paying for it, where compensation would be required if
the proposed use were for a school or a public library.
49. Id. at 2897.
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amble of each such ordinance or statute a finding that the mea-
sure prevented public harm. As Justice Scalia bluntly put it,
constitutional guarantees would depend on whether the public
hired an inept staff.50
At least by implication, Lucas gave some definition to
what is meant by an "economically viable use." Justice Black-
mun argued in dissent that the trial court's finding that the
property was rendered valueless was "almost certainly errone-
ous" because the property in fact had remaining uses: Lucas
could "picnic, swim, camp in a tent, or live on the property in a
moveable trailer," and he "retained the right to alienate the
land, which would have value for neighbors and for those pre-
pared to enjoy proximity to the ocean without a house. 51
Almost undoubtedly the property had some remaining dollar
value to someone for such uses, if only "salvage" value.52 Rec-
ognizing that the property had been purchased for $975,000 for
the purpose of building two homes, the majority, however, was
apparently not willing to accept such minimal or non-economic
uses, or salvage value, as being sufficient to disregard the trial
court's finding that the property had been deprived of all
value."3 The Supreme Court may, of course, have been doing
nothing more than applying the rule that trial court findings of
fact will not be reversed on appeal if supported by substantial
evidence. But they were also holding, at least implicitly, that
the facts relied on by Justice Blackmun were not adequate to
compel a conclusion that the property had "value" or "eco-
nomic use" for constitutional purposes. A contrary conclusion
in Lucas would have rendered the Taking Clause largely
meaningless in the regulatory context, because property almost
always has some remaining salvage value to someone.
In dicta, the Court also held open the prospect that some-
thing less than deprivation of all economically viable use could
50. Id. at 2898 n.12.
51. Id. at 2908 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
52. By the same reasoning, when no development is allowed on wetland property,
it is sometimes argued that the property still has "value" because it can be sold to
someone else seeking a wetland to enhance as mitigation for some other project. Also
by the same reasoning, in Valley View Industrial Park v. Redmond, 107 Wash. 2d 621,
733 P.2d 182 (1987), the City argued that the plaintiff's land still had value after being
downzoned from light industrial to agriculture zoning because it could be developed as
a raspberry or blueberry farm. The trial court in Valley View, as the Supreme Court
in Lucas, found that an unacceptable level of "use" given the owners' original
legitimate expectations.
53. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2896.
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constitute a taking.54 It characterized the deprivation of all
economically viable use as a "categorical" taking that did not
require "case-specific inquiry into the public interest advanced
in support of the restraint."5 It then pointed out that it was
unclear how the Court would analyze a situation where only
ninety or ninety-five percent of the use was denied. But, the
Court said, it was an error to assume that such a plaintiff could
not recover.5 Having dropped that comment, it gave abso-
lutely no guidance as to how it would resolve any future case.
The quality of the debate over constitutional takings would be
improved if the Court would state more clearly that such far-
fetched, minimal uses in comparison to the owner's reasonable
expectations simply do not pass constitutional muster. 7
Lucas is unique among successful takings plaintiffs in that
he had never applied for a permit and had failed to exhaust an
available administrative remedy at the time his case was
heard.' The dissent made much of the fact that Lucas had
held the lots as a speculative investment and had apparently
never applied for a building permit.59 Lucas's plight in that
regard is not uncommon. Most undeveloped property is held
by individuals who have good reason not to develop their prop-
erty at the moment, but who have held it and paid taxes on it
54. Id. at 2894 n.7.
55. Id. at 2893.
56. Id. at 2894-95 nn. 7 & 8.
57. Until the U.S. Supreme Court more firmly announces that common sense does
prevail, landowners will have to continue to defend against claims that a developer's
constitutional rights are protected if it can grow blueberries or camp in a tent on
property for which it has made a major investment.
Valley View Industrial Park v. Redmond, 107 Wash. 2d 621, 733 P.2d 182 (1987),
was decided as a taking case at the trial court level, although the Washington State
Supreme Court avoided the taking issue by deciding the case on vested rights grounds.
The plaintiff in Valley View, a developer, had acquired the last industrially zoned
property in the Sammamish River Valley, at industrial land prices, only to have the
land downzoned to agricultural use. Id. at 626, 733 P.2d at 186. The City of Redmond
argued to the trial court that the land still had viable economic use because the
developer could start a blueberry or raspberry farm on the property. Id. at 652, 733
P.2d at 201. The trial court summarily rejected that position. Id. at 652-53, 733 P.2d at
201. Trial courts seem generally unwilling to ignore common sense standards
concerning what are reasonable landowner expectations.
58. The more typical fate is that demonstrated in MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v.
Yolo County, 447 U.S. 340 (1986) (holding that the developer must apply for a less
dense development after the first development proposal was turned down); Hamilton
Bank in Williamson Co. Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson
City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985) (holding that a takings claim was not ripe because the
developer had not sought variances); and Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (holding
that a takings claim was not ripe because the plaintiff never applied for a permit).
59. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2908 n.5 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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in the belief that at the proper time it could be developed.
Those individuals are just as injured by a regulation that
makes their investment valueless and their property useless, as
is someone who is in the midst of an actual development. The
Supreme Court majority resolved the problem by focusing on
Lucas' claim for interim damages and by limiting this aspect of
the case to the pleadings.60 On remand, however, the issue of
whether the statute in fact injured Lucas remains open, partic-
ularly if South Carolina now grants Lucas administrative
relief.
The dissent also stressed that Lucas had not pursued a
statutorily provided administrative remedy to challenge the
location of the setback line affecting his property.61 The
majority relied on a stipulation that as of the time of trial no
permit would have been granted had Lucas applied for one6 1
and on the fact that the South Carolina Supreme Court had
declined to decide the case on exhaustion grounds and, instead,
decided it on the merits. Therefore, a failure of the United
States Supreme Court to reach the merits would foreclose any
later opportunity for Lucas to have the merits of his claim
considered.6 3
Although Lucas touched on many issues, its precedential
effect will be limited simply because it has simple, extreme
facts. Less than two months before the Lucas decision, the
Washington Supreme Court handed down three cases, Sintra,
Inc. v. Seattle,' Robinson v. Seattle,I and Lutheran Day Care
Center v. Snohomish County,66 each of which presented far
more complex facts and required the court to consider market
realities to an extent that the United States Supreme Court
has never done. Sintra and Robinson each raised takings as
well as substantive due process issues and demonstrated that
these doctrines may have vitality in protecting property owner
expectations in Washington. Futhermore, Lutheran Day Care
breathed new life into substantive due process analysis. As
with all property rights cases, however, the peculiar facts of
60. Id. at 2891 n.3.
61. Id. at 2907 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 2891 n.3.
63. Id. at 2891.
64. 119 Wash. 2d 1, 829 P.2d 765, cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 676 (1992).
65. 119 Wash. 2d 34, 830 P.2d 318, cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 676 (1992).
66. 119 Wash. 2d 91, 829 P.2d 746 (1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1044 (1993).
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these three cases are important. Thus, the extent to which
they will have precedential effect must be explored.
In Sintra, the Washington State Supreme Court engaged
in a much more complex, aggressive, and subtle analysis of the
facts that might constitute a taking than the analysis used by
the United States Supreme Court in Lucas or in any other
case. Cases before the United States Supreme Court have usu-
ally involved property owners who were told that they could
not use their property for the purpose for which it was
acquired.67 Sintra, by contrast, actually received the permit for
which it had applied. Its takings claim was that improper city
delays had caused it to loose the only market for its property
because another developer had filled the market in the
interim.68
Sintra bought a decrepit single-room occupancy hotel near
downtown Seattle in 1984, paying $670,000 and intending to
renovate it for a bed and breakfast.6 9 Those plans were scut-
tled in 1985 when an adult entertainment business opened next
door.70 Sintra tried to sell the building, but could find no
buyer.71 It could find no one to develop low-income housing on
the site. Eventually, Sintra concluded that the only profitable
use that could be made of the building was to convert it into a
ministorage warehouse and, in October 1985, Sintra applied for
a permit to do so.7" At this point, Sintra was informed that it
would have to pay a $219,840 housing demolition fee under the
City of Seattle's housing preservation ordinance (HPO) in
order to proceed with its plans.71 Sintra applied for adminis-
trative relief from that requirement, 74 and a series of adminis-
67. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles, 428 U.S. 304
(1987) (holding that church could no longer run a camp for handicapped children on
property); Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S.
172 (1985) (holding that developer could not build subdivision as called for by master
plan); San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981) (holding that
power company could not use property for a power plant).
68. Sintra, 119 Wash. 2d at 6, 829 P.2d at 768.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 7, 829 P.2d at 768.
72. Id.
73. I
74. The HPO provided for relief from the fee requirements if "but for the strict
and literal application of the housing requirement, the owner would be able to make
profitable use of his property." SEATTLE, WA., ORDINANCE 112342 § 13 (1985). The
burden was on the applicant to demonstrate entitlement to administrative relief.
Relief was to be the minimum that would allow profitable use of the property. In that
respect, the HPO was similar to the "reasonable use exceptions" included in numerous
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trative appeals was initiated. Then, in July 1987, in a case
brought by another developer, the Superior Court held the
HPO to be invalid.7' Nonetheless, the City continued to seek
at least limited application of the HPO to Sintra. Sintra con-
tinued its administrative appeals.78 Nine months later, the
state supreme court affirmed that the HPO was invalid.77 Still,
the saga continued. Not until June of 1987 did the City issue
Sintra's Master Use Permit without the HPO fee attached.7 s
By then, Sintra claimed that the market had changed so
that a ministorage warehouse was no longer feasible and, it
alleged, its property was left with no viable economic use.79
Sintra successfully sought rescission from its sellers on the
grounds of misrepresentation.80 Sintra also sued the City and
several of its employees for damages, alleging that its property
had been taken and that it had been denied substantive due
process.81
Sintra claimed that the City's delay and the relative exces-
wetlands ordinances now being adopted around the state. Sintra's claim was
essentially that the burden of administrative delays required to get through that
administrative process deprived it of any realistic opportunity to salvage its
investment. See Appellants' Brief at 12-16, Sintra (No. 57029-9). Sintra's claim is
greatly bolstered by the fact that the underlying fee from which it sought relief was
ultimately declared invalid. Experience indicates that the administrative cost and
delay of seeking a permit to develop wetlands where there is otherwise no viable use
of the property may frequently exceed the value of the property.
Thus, Sintra suggests that a "reasonable use provision" may not insulate a city
from liability if the procedure for utilizing that provision is itself sufficiently
burdensome, or if it permits such onerous mitigation to be imposed on a permitted
development that the project remains non-viable. "Reasonable use exceptions" are
only effective to prevent what would otherwise be a taking if (1) they are not in
themselves unreasonably burdensome and (2) the administrators charged with
applying them can evaluate the real world market factors that determine whether a
project is viable. Frequently, neither of those conditions exist. Attorneys charged
with drafting such provisions often assume that the presence of a "reasonable use
exception" provision would insulate an ordinance from a takings claim, regardless of
the facts in any particular case. It would seem from Sintra that such provisions are
not particularly effective.
75. Sintra, 119 Wash. 2d at 8, 829 P.2d at 769.
76. Id.
77. San Telmo Assocs. v. Seattle, 108 Wash. 2d 20, 735 P.2d 673 (1987).
78. The supreme court may have confused a "change of use permit" with a
"master use permit." The court's decision says both were issued on June 22, 1987. The
parties' briefs indicate that the City issued a "change of use" license without the HPO
fee eight days after the state supreme court's San Telmo decision. See Appellants'
Brief at 18, and Respondents' Brief at 14, Sintra (No. 57029-9).
79. Sintra, 119 Wash. 2d at 9, 19, 829 P.2d at 769, 774.
80. Id. at 10, 829 P.2d at 770.
81. Id.
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siveness of the City's fee constituted a taking."2 In this regard,
Sintra's takings claim differs from the more common scenario
in which the limitations placed by the City on property use are
targeted as a taking. Indeed, in Sintra, it appeared that a wide
range of uses might have been legally permitted-had they
been economically feasible in that location with the fee. Sin-
tra's claim thus required the court to look much more closely
at market realities than it otherwise would most takings
claims, where typically the property owner has been prevented
from proceeding with the development for which the property
is most suited.
Sintra came to the Washington State Supreme Court after
the trial court granted the City's motion for summary judg-
ment on all of Sintra's claims."3 The supreme court therefore
did not need to decide whether a taking or a violation of Sin-
tra's substantive due process rights had occurred. It only
needed to decide whether Sintra was entitled to try to prove its
allegations to a jury. The court held that in all respects, except
for its claim of a federal civil rights violation for the taking,
Sintra was entitled to go forward and to attempt to prove its
case.84 Thus, by implication, it held that if a jury accepted Sin-
tra's view of the facts and rejected the City's view, then Sintra
was entitled to recover.8 5 In doing so, the Washington court
may have suggested several things about what will constitute a
taking in this state under the GMA.
The court first pointed out that in an earlier decision, San
Telmo Associates v. Seattle, 6 it had "noted, in dicta, that the
high fees involved [in the HPO] could constitute a taking
under the Washington Constitution. '8 7 The only issue in San
Telmo was whether the HPO fees were an unauthorized tax. 8
Thus, the court's dicta about a taking in San Telmo might be
viewed as gratuitous. On the other hand, when the court
recalls that dicta in a case alleging a taking, one must assume
that the court is entirely serious. If so, it suggests that exces-
82. Id. at 17, 829 P.2d at 774.
83. Id. at 10, 829 P.2d at 770.
84. Id at 29, 829 P.2d at 780-81.
85. Had the court concluded that even if a jury accepted Sintra's view of the facts
Sintra had not stated a claim, or would be barred by one of the City's defenses, there
would have been no reason to remand the case for trial.
86. 108 Wash. 2d 20, 735 P.2d 673 (1987).
87. Sintra, 119 Wash. 2d at 9, 829 P.2d at 769.
88. See San Telmo, 108 Wash. 2d 20, 735 P.2d 673.
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sive impact fees imposed under the GMA may also constitute a
taking in the right case.
Second, the court sent the case back to trial on the appar-
ently hotly contested question of whether the City's actions in
simply continuing to require Sintra to go through the adminis-
trative process, even after the superior court invalidated the
HPO, had the effect of destroying Sintra's investment.8 9 When
cities think of takings claims they usually think of a situation
where an owner is, at the end of the process, denied the right
to make use of his property. Sintra was eventually issued a
permit. Sintra's claim was not that he was turned down, but
that the process dragged on until his market was gone. Public
bodies have made something of an art of creating burdensome
and exhausting administrative remedies that must be pursued
before a property owner can seek judicial relief."
For instance, the staff responsible for issuing permits is
frequently under pressure from opponents of a proposal to
deny a project and staff members frequently see demanding
more information as an appropriate way both to avoid making
a decision that might anger one side or the other and to add
weight to their decision, whichever way it is made. 91 Staff
members are frequently oblivious to the cost and delay of such
requests for information and to the impact that they have on
the feasibility of the project. Thus, in most cases where a
municipality or active citizens want to prevent development,
property owners have had to abandon their projects and absorb
their losses without remedy. If, however, Sintra means that a
court can consider, as part of a takings claim, whether the pro-
cess itself deprived an owner of viable use of its property, it
may mean that municipalities will drag out the administrative
process at their peril. If cities have to pay the cost of having
"lost the market," they will share some of a developer's desire
not to have the project rendered infeasible by the sheer pas-
sage of time.
Finally, the Sintra takings decision gives flesh to the right
89. Sintra, 119 Wash. 2d at 17, 829 P.2d at 774.
90. See Pleas v. Seattle, 112 Wash. 2d 794, 774 P.2d 1158 (1989).
91. In the case of a grocery store for which the Author was responsible for seeking
permits, the city staff person charged with the ultimate decision received numerous
phone calls and dozens of letters from citizen opponents long after all official comment
periods had closed. City processing of the building permit for the project, which
required no zoning change or design review or variances, took four and one-half years,
including one complete redesign of the project.
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to compensation even for a temporary regulatory taking. The
HPO was eventually invalidated and the restrictions that it
placed on Sintra's property were eliminated. The court made
clear that Sintra need not prove that the property remained
unuseable after the HPO was invalidated.92 By the time Sin-
tra's claim reached the court, Sintra had obtained rescission of
its purchase of the property-it didn't even own the property
anymore. Nonetheless, the court held open the possibility that
Sintra was still entitled to recover for a temporary taking of its
property while it was held.
The practical long-term effect of the Sintra decision will
depend on how it is applied in later cases. To date, however,
plaintiffs in takings cases have had to withstand every possible
defense that their property never was buildable, that their pro-
ject never was financable, that the delay while the offending
ordinance was in effect caused no injury in fact, and that their
damage was caused by the wrongful acts of their seller, buyer,
bank or others, etc.93 The Sintra court did not guarantee that
Sintra would survive such defenses at trial. It did, however,
tell public bodies that such defenses may not allow them to
avoid a trial. 4
Of at least as much significance as its takings analysis is
the Sintra court's substantive due process analysis. The court
made clear that substantive due process is a viable alternative
theory of recovery for excessive regulation and that substan-
tive due process and takings theories are not mutually exclu-
sive.9 5 Substantive due process may be used to invalidate an
92. Sintra, 119 Wash. 2d at 15-16, 829 P.2d at 773.
93. The decisions in Lucas and Sintra may indicate that courts are coming to
understand just how prescient Justice Brennan was in his dissent in San Diego Gas &
Electric v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 655 n.22 (1981). Justice Brennan warned that
unless owners were compensated for temporary takings, property rights would be
thwarted by endless city maneuvering. See, e.g., Pleas v. Seattle, 112 Wash. 2d 794, 774
P.2d 1158 (1989). There is at least some reason to be optimistic.
94. Sintra, 119 Wash. 2d at 18, 829 P.2d at 774.
95. Presbytery of Seattle v. King County, 114 Wash. 2d 320, 329, 787 P.2d 907, 912
(1990), suggested that its threshold inquiry was to determine which alternative theory,
takings or due process, would be applicable to a regulation. The Presbytery court
implied that only one theory would apply to any given regulation. Sintra, however,
suggests that although a regulation that does not constitute a taking may nonetheless
violate substantive due process, if it does constitute a taking, it may also violate
substantive due process. Sintra, 119 Wash. 2d at 29, 829 P.2d at 780 (reversing and
remanding for trial the summary judgment against Sintra on both its takings and its
substantive due process claims). The Supreme Court in Guimont v. Clarke, 121 Wash.
2d 586, 854 P.2d 1 (1993), reiterated its statement in Presbytery that where both a
takings claim and a substantive due process claim are made, the takings claim is
1993] 1239
1240 University of Puget Sound Law Review [Vol. 16:1223
ordinance that fails to pass a judicial balancing test. 6 In that
test, the court asks (1) whether the regulation is aimed at
achieving a legitimate public purpose; (2) whether it uses
means that are reasonably necessary to achieve that purpose;
and (3) whether it is unduly oppressive to the landowner. 7
Although described as a "balancing" test, suggesting that a
finding in favor of the regulation on one prong might outweigh
a finding against it on another, the court's analysis suggests
that an ordinance must pass both the first and third tests, if
not all three tests, to withstand a substantive due process chal-
lenge. The court found that the regulation in Sintra met the
first prong of the test-it was clearly aimed at achieving a
legitimate public purpose.9 Yet, that fact was given no weight
when balanced against the court's doubts that it met the sec-
ond test and the court's conviction that it was unduly oppres-
sive and, therefore, failed to meet the third test.9
Sintra highlights the limitation of substantive due process
as a protection for overregulated property owners. It is much
more likely to be a grounds for invalidation of a regulation
than for recovery of damages."° Invalidation of a regulation,
without being able to recover the cost of being burdened by its
enforcement and the need to bring a lawsuit to overturn the
ordinance, is in most cases a Pyrrhic victory for a landowner.
Only if a property owner can prove that the regulation or its
application was not only invalid on substantive due process
analyzed first. In Guimont the court found no takings, so the court had no reason to
decide whether a successful takings claim would preclude a substantive due process
claim.
96. Sintra, 119 Wash. 2d at 21, 829 P.2d at 776.
97. Id. Whether the regulation is "unduly oppressive" also requires a balancing
test.
98. Id.
99. Presumably, if a court found that a regulation failed to achieve a legitimate
public purpose, the court would invalidate it even if the regulation's means were
relatively reasonable and its burden slight. Under Nolan v. California Coastal
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), such an ordinance may also constitute a taking. One can
conceive of regulations aimed at legitimate public purposes that are not as drastically
aggressive as the HPO, but that clearly use means that go far beyond the minimum
necessary to achieve the stated ends. Whether the Washington court would invalidate
such an ordinance remains to be seen. Since the court-packing days of Franklin
Roosevelt, courts have generally refused to intervene when they disagree with the
means selected by a legislative body to achieve its ends. The Sintra court's citation to
Lawton v. Steel, 152 U.S. 133 (1894), to support its balancing test suggests that the
court may be willing to return to a more aggressive review of regulations that go too
far.
100. Sintra, 119 Wash. 2d at 23, 829 P.2d at 777.
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grounds, but was also arbitrary or irrational, 101 can the prop-
erty owner recover damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a sub-
stantive due process violation." 2 Simple enforcement of an
unconstitutional ordinance, before it has been ruled unconsti-
tutional, does not create liability for damages. 10 3 The City of
Seattle's problem in Sintra was that it continued to enforce its
HPO after a superior court judge had ruled it illegal. The
court indicated that a jury could be justified in finding such
conduct arbitrary or irrational.1°4
Sintra's companion case, Robinson v. Seattle,10 5 is interest-
ing for the purposes of this Article because of its balancing of
the various factors that make a measure "unduly oppressive"
and therefore a denial of substantive due process.' 6 Robinson
was a class action by all those who had actually paid the same
HPO fee that was in issue in Sintra both before and after the
superior court first invalidated it. 0 7 By definition, the class
members were owners who had gone forward with projects
that changed the use of low-income housing buildings, because
that was the only reason one paid the HPO fee.
The Washington State Supreme Court found no taking
had occurred because it could not find that the ordinance
denied all viable economic use of all regulated properties. 08 It
did find, however, that the ordinance could have been invali-
dated as to all the plaintiffs on substantive due process
grounds.'0 9 The court followed the reasoning in Sintra, but
101. Id.
102. If a property owner can prove that a regulation or its enforcement was
arbitrary and capricious, then he or she can recover damages under WASH. REV. CODE
§ 64.40.020 (1992). On the other hand, if the regulation or its enforcement is "merely"
unlawful, the property owner must prove that the final decision-maker knew or
should have known that the regulation or its enforcement was unlawful. Lutheran
Day Care v. Snohomish County, 119 Wash. 91, 112, 829 P.2d 746, 756 (1992), cert
denied, 113 S. Ct. 1044 (1993).
103. Lutheran Day Care, 119 Wash. at 112, 829 P.2d at 756.
104. Sintra, 119 Wash. 2d at 29, 829 P.2d at 780.
105. 119 Wash. 2d 34, 830 P.2d 318 (1992), cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 1044 (1993).
106. Id. at 51, 830 P.2d at 329. A substantive due process anlaysis requires the
court to engage in a three-part balancing test: first, is the regulation aimed at
achieving a legitimate public purpose; second, are the means used reasonably necessary
to achieve that purpose; and third, is the measure unduly oppressive. Id.
107. Id. at 47, 830 P.2d at 326.
108. Id. at 54, 830 P.2d at 330. Robinson demonstrates, again, the impracticability
of a facial challenge to an ordinance on takings grounds. Only if an ordinance creates
a physical invasion of property or denies a "fundamental right," such as the right to
exclude others, is there any prospect of challenging an ordinance on its face on takings
grounds.
109. Id. at 54-56, 830 P.2d at 330-331.
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elaborated on why the ordinance was "unduly oppressive.""10
The Robinson court pointed out that although the public prob-
lem of homelessness was very serious, the extent to which any
one parcel contributed to the overall problem was not particu-
larly great."' The lack of low-income housing was a function
of how all Seattle landowners used their property. Therefore,
it was unduly oppressive, particularly given the magnitude of
the fees in question, to place the full responsibility on the few
owners whose property came under the ordinance." The idea
that a few individual parcels should not bear the full burden of
correcting problems caused by many is one that may have sub-
stantial importance to the implementation of the GMA.
The cases decided to date by both the United States
Supreme Court and the Washington State Supreme Court pro-
vide some hope for property owners that the Constitution can
protect them from the excesses of government in the name of
the public good. Each case, however, has turned on its own
facts. The question is what vitality will the principles enunci-
ated in the case law have when applied to some hypothetical
plaintiffs who reflect actual fact patterns now developing
across the state.
Exactly how much precedential value Sintra, Robinson,
and their companion case, Lutheran Day Care v. Snohomish
County," 3 will have may depend on how much the court is
influenced in those cases by a conviction that the public bodies
involved are disregarding judicial orders. In Sintra and Robin-
son, the Washington State Supreme Court was clearly per-
suaded that the City's enforcement of the HPO after it was
first invalidated by the superior court reflected disrespect for
the law by the City."4 Any trial lawyer knows that there is
110. The court reiterated the list of factors to be considered in determining
whether a provision is unduly oppressive:
On the public's side, the seriousness of the public problem, the extent to
which the owner's land contributes to it, the degree to which the proposed
regulation solves it and the feasibility of less oppressive solutions would all be
relevant. On the owner's side, the amount and percentage of value loss, the
extent of remaining uses, past, present and future uses, temporary or
permanent nature of the regulation, the extent to which the owner should
have anticipated such regulation and how feasible it is for the owner to alter
present or currently planned uses.
Robinson, 119 Wash. 2d at 54-55, 830 P.2d at 331.
111. Id. at 55, 830 P.2d at 331.
112. Id.
113. 119 Wash. 2d 91, 829 P.2d 746 (1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1044 (1993).
114. In Sintra the court stated that: "Intentional violations for court orders
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no more effective way to prejudice an entire case than to
appear to disobey the court's orders.
Lutheran Day Care was not as clear cut. This case was the
plaintiff's second judicial appeal from a denial of its permit." 5
The court held that the first denial was contrary to law and
remanded the matter to the county. 116 The county held a hear-
ing and denied the permit again." 7 The trial court in the sec-
ond appeal specifically asked the county what in the record
supported the second denial, but the county could point to
nothing. 18 Those facts, too, create an inference that the
county was flaunting, ignoring, or being above the law. Pre-
sumably cities and counties will learn from Sintra, Robinson,
and Lutheran Day Care to be extremely cautious once they
have lost one lawsuit on a subject. It remains to be seen
whether a court will be willing to protect property rights as
aggressively when the court's own dignity is not in question.
II. THE COMING CASES: WHO MIGHT THE POTENTIAL
PLAINTIFFS BE?
Who are some of the likely plaintiffs that will be raising
issues in the future and how are they likely to fare? This sec-
tion describes hypothetical plaintiffs who feel aggrieved by the
requirements of the GMA.
A. Those Who Are Left Outside of the Urban Growth
Boundary
The GMA requires that each county determine areas
within which urban density growth served by urban level serv-
ices is to be encouraged and outside of which urban density
growth will be prohibited. 119 No decision will have as profound
an impact on the value of the property as the decision of
whether property is inside or outside of the urban growth
cannot be tolerated. Respect for the rule of law lies at the heart of due process, and
disregard of that law by government can only be considered violative of that right."
Sintra, 119 Wash. 2d at 24, 829 P.2d at 778. Similarly, the court stated in Robinson
that: 'rhe city officials may very well have had the public welfare in mind in
continuing enforcement of judicially invalidated HPO provisions, but intentional
violations of court orders cannot be tolerated." Robinson, 119 Wash. 2d at 69, 830 P.2d
at 338.
115. Lutheran Day Care, 119 Wash. 2d at 96, 829 P.2d at 748.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.110 (1992).
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boundary. People who fear being left out of the potential to
develop their property to urban levels form a significant por-
tion of the "property rights" lobby that has come before the
state legislature. Unfortunately, most parties left outside of
the urban growth boundary are unlikely to find much constitu-
tional protection.
Probably the largest group of people who feel themselves
aggrieved by the GMA are people who twenty years ago
bought twenty or one hundred acres well outside of urban
areas. In many cases, their property has been subject to some
form of "general" zoning, 20 which may in theory have allowed
subdivisions as small as half-acre lots. Indeed, it was the scat-
tered subdivision of similar land, beyond the range of efficient
urban services, that helped motivate the legislature to pass the
GMA."' These property owners have lived on the property,
enjoyed its rural character, raised their families there, and
assumed that their retirement nest egg would be generated
from selling the land for a subdivision. Although the property
could be sold to someone seeking to use it for the same pur-
pose it has always been used for, at a price well above what the
owner originally paid, that price is a fraction of the price the
property would command if it could be subdivided. Now, per-
haps on the brink of that planned retirement, the owners'
property is left outside of the urban growth boundary and the
ability to subdivide is gone. The property's value plummets
and eliminates their retirement income.
Should the owners bring a class action suit and claim that
the down-zoning of their property and others similarly situated
was a taking? Robinson set forth the standard for when a reg-
ulation, on its face, constitutes a taking. "For a facial challenge
to succeed, the landowner must show that the regulation
denies all economically viable use of any parcel of regulated
property in order to constitute a taking."' 2 That standard is
almost undoubtedly not provable in this area because the prop-
erty retains value as a hobby farm. That value is less than
120. Various jurisdictions have had some form of general zoning. It typically was
applied to largely undeveloped areas beyond the immediate path of development. It
permitted a wide variety of uses, depending on the availability of water and sewage
disposal. If an owner could succeed in providing water to the area, subdivisions with as
small as one-acre lots were sometimes possible even without sewers. If a sewer line
could be brought to the property, even higher densities were occasionally permitted.
121. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70.010 (1992).
122. Robinson, 119 Wash. 2d at 53, 830 P.2d at 328 (emphasis in original).
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what the owners once imagined their land was worth, and per-
haps much less than the property's value was before the urban
growth boundary was set. But this devaluation does not rise to
the level of the complete destruction standard required for a
facial taking.
At first blush, a substantive due process challenge might
appear to be a more viable remedy. The exhaustion of admin-
istrative remedies is not necessarily required.123 In a substan-
tive due process claim, the court is asked to balance the public
interest in the regulation against the hardship imposed on the
property.'24 It is improbable that a court would not be so
shocked by the balance struck when someone is left outside of
the urban growth boundary, no matter what the owner's per-
sonal expections had been, than without more than is shown in
our hypothetical it would invalidate the regulation.
Are the results any different in a takings challenge
brought by an individual owner?1m Every case is fact depen-
dent, but again, the outlook is unpromising. The owner's con-
cern is not that he is forbidden from using the property as it
has always been used, but that he has been denied the opportu-
nity to profit from it in a way that for many years he had rea-
sonably expected. These expectations, however, are not the
sort of expectations that the courts have tended to constitu-
tionally protect. These plaintiffs are, at best, in the same shoes
as Penn Central Railroad was in the Penn Central case.'2 6
B. The Farm That Cannot Be Farmed Any More
A narrower question can be raised by a related hypotheti-
cal. In this second hypothetical, the property owner is missing
123. See Presbytery of Seattle v. King County, 114 Wash. 2d 320, 333, 787 P.2d 907,
914, cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 284 (1990) (stating that only an "as applied" takings claim
requires exhaustion); but see Sintra, 119 Wash. 2d at 18, 829 P.2d at 775 (stating that
exhaustion is necessary before a court can properly consider a takings claim).
124. Robinson, 119 Wash. 2d at 54, 830 P.2d at 330.
125. An "as applied" challenge requires exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 333, 787 P.2d at 914. In the example posited, however,
there may not be many administrative remedies to exhaust. If an owner is contending
that his property would be taken even if he were permitted any use under the zoning
code, there should be no need to go through the whole process before a takings claim
can be brought. Cf. Allingham v. Seattle, 109 Wash. 2d 947, 749 P.2d 160 (1988),
overruled in part on other grounds by Presbytery of Seattle v. King County, 114 Wash.
2d 320, 787 P.2d 907 (1990); Orion Corp. v. State, 103 Wash. 2d 441, 693 P.2d 1369 (1985)
("Orion I").
126. See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). See also
supra text accompanying notes 25-36.
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a critical ingredient that the Penn Central court stressed was
central to its decision; namely, the historic use of the property
is no longer economically viable127 because of changes that
have resulted from other owners' permitted land development.
This second hypothetical property owner is faced with the
dilemma that if he is not permitted to develop his land as he
had expected, his land has, essentially, no value.
For thirty years, Farmer Jones has been in the dairy busi-
ness on eighty acres in a narrow valley a mile outside of what
thirty years ago was a quiet western Washington town not far
from Seattle. Thirty years ago, all of Farmer Jones' neighbors
were farmers. Thirty years ago, traffic on the road by Farmer
Jones' farm was as likely to include farmers riding tractors or
kids riding horses as people driving cars. Over the years,
though, the neighboring farms were sold. Between Farmer
Jones and the town, farms have been converted to light indus-
trial parks and warehouses. Further away, the land has been
sold to speculators or investors who have held it waiting for
the right time to develop. Although a few marginally eco-
nomic "agricultural" uses have been started on scattered par-
cels, the majority of the land that has not been converted to
urban use lies fallow. Most of Farmer Jones' neighbors made
more money selling their land and retiring than they had ever
made from raising cows. Farmer Jones equally expected that
his retirement nest egg would come from selling his land to a
new owner who would convert it to another use.
Less visible changes have also occurred. As one farmer
after another sold out, the vegetable processing plants in the
area moved north to the Skagit Valley. The feed dealer in
town closed. The implement dealer that Farmer Jones relied
on now sells and services only garden tractors. Residential
development has been allowed on the hills overlooking the val-
ley and the new neighbors do not particularly like the smell of
cow manure. Occasionally, kids make sport of standing by
Farmer Jones' fence and throwing stones or shooting BB's at
his cows. As a result of the residential development, traffic on
the road by his farm has increased with commuters driving to
their jobs. It is now frightening and dangerous to drive a trac-
tor on the road. In short, there is no longer an option to sell
the farm to a next generation dairy farmer. Although Farmer
Jones has hung on, no one else would consider beginning a
127. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 138.
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dairy business there. Nor is the land particularly suited to a
"hobby farm." With old buildings, a busy road next to it, an
industrial development next door, and no amenities, the prop-
erty lacks the romance city dwellers fleeing the city expect to
find.128
Now, seeking to fulfill the GMA's objectives of preserving
resource lands and rural areas, the county draws the urban
growth boundary between Farmer Jones and the industrial
development next door, designating Farmer Jones' land"rural," while the land on each side of him is "urban." His
land can no longer be converted to a higher use. Nor is it eco-
nomically viable for the use to which he has put it. That use is
no longer feasible or economically viable because of the very
changes in use by other property that Farmer Jones now
wishes to enjoy for himself.
No Washington case has squarely addressed Farmer Jones'
predicament. Several cases have suggested in dicta, however,
that in such a case a taking might be found. In Penn Central,
the court emphasized that its decision was based on the record
before it; namely, that there was no dispute that Grand Cen-
tral Terminal was capable of earning a reasonable return on
Penn Central's investment." The City of New York had "con-
ceded at oral argument that if [Penn Central] can demonstrate
at some point in the future that circumstances have so changed
that the Terminal ceases to be 'economically viable,' [it] may
obtain relief."'"3 The Supreme Court's repeated reference to
the facts in the record suggests that they were critical to the
Court's decision, 3 ' and had they been different, the Court's
conclusion would have been different. Here that key ingredi-
ent in Penn Central is missing because Farmer Jones cannot
earn a reasonable income from his property. Therefore, the
court would probably offer Farmer Jones relief.
The language of Carlson v. Bellevue1 2-"adaptability ...
assumes not the most profitable use, but that some permitted
128. The Author is aware of several properties fitting the description of Farmer
Jones in King County, Washington. In several instances, King County has addressed
the issue by purchasing the farmer's development rights. The Consitution clearly
favors this approach.
129. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 136, 138 n.36.
130. Id. at 138 n.36.
131. Id. at 129, 136, 136 n.36.
132. 73 Wash. 2d 41, 435 P.2d 957 (1968).
124719931
1248 University of Puget Sound Law Review [Vol. 16:1223
use can be profitable"'--equally suggests that if circum-
stances change so that no permitted use is profitable, a zoning
change may be required to allow the land to be put to profita-
ble use.
A contrary idea may be suggested by the notion in Lucas
that a state's common law might have ruled out from the
beginning any reasonable expectation that property could be
put to certain uses.134 The Supreme Court emphasized, how-
ever, that any such prohibition must have been part of com-
mon law doctrines such as nuisance, which inhere in the title
to the land itself.135 Although not spelling out the limits of
such doctrines, the Court said that "the fact that a particular
use has long been engaged in by similarly situated owners ordi-
narily imports a lack of any common-law prohibition."'" In
the hypothetical, the use to which Farmer Jones wishes to put
his property (an industrial park) and the fact that others
around him have been permitted to do what he seeks to do,
strongly suggest that no common law principles would prohibit
such a use.137
The GMA has a strong policy of preserving agriculture and
other resource lands. The first obligation of all counties is to
designate resource lands and critical areas,"3 and every county
and city that is required or that chooses to plan under the
GMA is required to protect those lands. 39 The drafters of the
GMA recognized, however, that for some resource lands, the
GMA came too late.' 4° Where surrounding uses are already
urban in character, resource uses such as agricultural and for-
estry may no longer be possible or feasible. Where that urban-
133. Id. at 51, 435 P.2d at 963 (emphasis added) (quoting 8 E. McQuILLAN,
MuNIcIPAL CoRPORATIoNS § 25.45, at 117 (3d ed. rev. 1965)).
134. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2899-2900 (1992).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 2901.
137. An equally compelling and probably more frequently occurring hypothetical
could be described for Forester Jones, whose 500 acres of private timberland has been
surrounded by urban dwellers who object to slash disposal burns and aerial spraying,
and who are aghast at clear-cuts. Modern economic forest management requires
activities that many urban-dwellers find offensive. If those activities are forbidden,
private forestry becomes economically impossible. Furthermore, public agencies are
not as negatively impacted by such regulations because they can choose not to worry
about the returns they make or don't make on their forest investments.
138. WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70A.170 (1992).
139. Id. § 36.70A.060.
140. Id. § 36.70A.170(1)(a)-(c) (requiring designation of only those resource lands
that are not "already characterized by urban growth and have long-term significance
for commercial production").
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ization has occurred, fundamental fairness requires that the
lands be allowed to be converted to a higher use rather than be
left with no viable use at all.
C. The Industrial "Wetland"
Not all frustrated expectations arise from property owner-
ship outside the urban growth boundary. Inside the urban
growth boundary the GMA requires protection of critical
areas. 4 1 In protecting critical areas, local governments will
render unusable some properties that its owners had every rea-
son to believe had substantial value. This is most frequently
the case with wetlands. Our changing definition of what is a
wetland now encompasses far more than marshes and swamps.
It includes not only obviously wet property that has histori-
cally been filled and developed across western Washington, but
also property that no layman, and not many experienced devel-
opers, would recognize as a wetland.
The biggest hurdle for many property owners caught in
the wetland trap is exhausting their administrative remedies.
If they can overcome that hurdle, compensation should be
awarded, in a proper case, if development is denied to protect a
wetland.
To illustrate, Brand X Transport Company's business is
located on the broad, flat river valley land in the industrial
area of a western Washington city. As with most western
Washington valleys, the soil on the property lies flat. Water
sometimes stands for a few days after heavy rains in the winter
and early spring. All summer long the land is dry. Fifteen
years ago, when Brand X located there, it bought not only
enough land for its immediate needs, but also five additional
acres for future expansion. In the intervening years, most of
the remaining industrial zoned land in the city was purchased
and developed, including the land surrounding Brand X.
Brand X recently decided that it was time to expand. An
engineer drew up plans for an additional warehouse and park-
ing area. When Brand X applied for a permit, however, it was
informed that half of its property was now considered a Class
IV isolated wetland. With required buffers under the city's
newly adopted wetlands ordinance, only a strip of land about
thirty feet wide on the far side of the property was "available"
141. 1& § 36.70A.060.
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for development. Brand X was informed that before the city
could consider its application, Brand X must prepare an envi-
ronmental impact statement (EIS). It was further informed
that under the city's ordinance, no development could be
allowed, even under the ordinance's reasonable use exception,
unless the developer mitigated the impacts by creating else-
where a comparable sized wetland with full buffers. The city
official made it clear, however, that no final decision could be
made until an EIS had been completed. Brand X consulted
with its engineer and other experts and determined that the
cost of the EIS, acquiring land for mitigation, and actually cre-
ating the comparable wetland was likely to be greater than the
value of the land itself.
Can Brand X claim its property has been taken or invali-
date the regulation on substantive due process grounds?
Brand X's taking claim is almost certainly not ripe because
it has not yet exhausted its administrative remedies and
obtained a final decision as to what will be permitted. Division
I of the Washington State Court of Appeals considered very
similar facts in Bellevue 120th Associates v. Bellevue."4 The
plaintiffs there concluded that the administrative process it
was being asked to go through was "costly and useless" and
asked "that they be allowed to cut through the.., tangle."' 43
The plaintiffs were concerned that preparing an EIS and revis-
ing their plans would be a waste of time given the City's appar-
ent position, but the court held that these circumstances did
not excuse them from pursuing their administrative remedies
to a final decision.144 The court cited Justice Stevens' concur-
rence in Williamson County Regional Planning Commission
v. Hamilton Bank,45 where he said that such expense is the
"inevitable cost of doing business in a highly regulated
society."'1 46
142. 65 Wash. App. 594, 829 P.2d 182, rev. denied, 119 Wash. 2d 1021, 838 P.2d 691
(1992).
143. Id. at 601, 829 P.2d at 186.
144. Id.
145. 473 U.S. 172 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring).
146. Id. at 204. A landowner need not exhaust administrative remedies if it can
persuade a court that they would be "futile." See Orion Corp. v. State, 103 Wash. 2d
441, 457, 693 P.2d 1369, 1379 (1985) ("Orion I"). The question of futility is for the court,
not for the jury. Estate of Friedman v. Pierce County, 112 Wash. 2d 68, 77, 768 P.2d
462, 466 (1989). The landowner's burden of showing futility, however, is "substantial."
Id. In fact, futility has not yet been established by anything less than a showing that
even if every administrative remedy that could legally be granted was granted, the
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Can Brand X be excused from the burden of exhausting
its administrative remedies before pursuing a takings claim
because the cost of exhausting those remedies, combined with
the cost of mitigation, is greater than the value of the land?
The court in Orion Corp. v. State'4 7 said that there are excep-
tions to the doctrine of exhaustion "in circumstances in which
these policies [favoring exhaustion] are outweighed by consid-
eration of fairness or practicality."' 48 It then used the situation
where exhaustion would be "futile" as but one example of
such circumstances. 49 Futility was found in Orion because
there were no present, possible, and reasonably profitable uses
to which the property was reasonably adapted and which could
be permitted under Skagit County's shoreline master program.
By contrast, in the hypothetical, some use may ultimately be
allowed, although depending on how much use is allowed and
the mitigation ultimately required, it may not be economically
viable.
Distressed landowners would love to have the courts eval-
uate "fairness and practicability" with an eye toward protect-
ing their property interests. Pretty clearly the courts do not.
As of today, it requires a far more extreme set of facts for the
courts to conclude that requiring further exhaustion would be
unfair and impractical than it takes to persuade a reasonable
developer or property owner that he cannot afford to proceed
further with a project. As a result, a businessman faced with
costs of exhausting administrative remedies and mitigating the
loss of wetland that are equal to the value of the property
itself will not continue to exhaust administrative remedies.
Unfortunately, untold numbers of property owners simply
abandon development of their property. As the courts estab-
lish more solid standards to be used when deciding the merits
of the takings issues, they should closely examine the practical
burdens that the current exhaustion doctrine has created and
bring it more into line with practical realities.
Although a takings claim clearly requires exhaustion of
administrative remedies, it is a little less clear whether, in a
property would still have no viable economic use. See Allingharn v. Seattle, 109 Wash.
2d 947, 749 P.2d 160 (1988), overruled in part on other grounds by Presbytery of Seattle
v. King County, 114 Wash. 2d 320, 787 P.2d 907 (Wash. 1990).
147. 103 Wash. 2d 441, 693 P.2d 1369 (1985) ("Orion I").
148. Id. at 457, 693 P.2d at 1378 (quoting South Hollywood Mill Citizens Ass'n v.
King Co., 101 Wash. 2d 68, 74, 677 P.2d 114, 118 (1984)).
149. Id.
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sufficiently egregious case, a substantive due process case
might be allowed to go forward prior to the actual exhaustion
of administrative remedies if it has been brought to invalidate
overly burdensome requirements. Substantive due process
claims do not necessarily present the same requirements of
exhaustion and ripeness that takings claims present because, in
a takings claim, the plaintiff need not show that no economi-
cally viable use will be allowed.150 The Washington court has
twice now said that excessive fees may constitute a taking.15 1
It might be that the combination of excessive cost and delay in
review, combined with a requirement of mitigation that would
be excessively costly in the best case, would seem so unbal-
anced that the court would find a substantive due process vio-
lation before the owner actually spent the time and money to
complete the administrative process. The issue in a suit to
invalidate a regulation on substantive due process grounds is
whether, considering the public purpose to be served, the alter-
nate available means of achieving the purpose, and the degree
to which the regulation is unduly oppressive, the regulation is
unreasonable or arbitrary.152 Although protecting wetlands
would probably be considered a public purpose, protecting an
isolated Class IV wetland should not be given undue weight in
the balancing test. There is no connectivity between an iso-
lated Class IV wetland and any larger body of water. For
instance, an isolated Class IV wetland has no role in filtering
larger water bodies and protecting water quality. It also, by
virtue of its isolation, provides no part of a larger ecosystem
for animals. In short, its principal virtue is as a resting spot for
migrating ducks, if any happen to be migrating when it is wet.
When deciding the merits of a substantive due process claim,
the courts should consider the individual facts. In this case,
the public purpose side of the equation is very weak.
Suppose Brand X completes the administrative process
and is allowed to build some reduced scale facility on the prop-
erty. Further suppose that Brand X then concludes that, in
spite of a finding by city staff to the contrary, it is not economi-
cally viable to proceed with the expansion because of the limi-
150. But see Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d 320, 787 P.2d 907 (holding that exhaustion
was necessary to determine whether the ordinance was unduly oppressive and, thus,
violative of substantive due process).
151. Robinson v. Seattle, 119 Wash. 2d 34, 830 P.2d 318, cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 676
(1992); San Telmo Assocs. v. Seattle, 108 Wash. 2d 20, 735 P.2d 673 (1987).
152. Sintra, 119 Wash. 2d at 20-21, 829 P.2d at 776.
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tations imposed or the mitigation required. At this point, can
Brand X prevail in a takings claim? Under the principles
enunciated in Penn Central, and in a proper case, the answer
should be "yes."
In this hypothetical, the answer will depend heavily on the
specific facts, including just how defensible Brand X's conclu-
sion is that development is not viable. The city will try to
prove that what it has permitted is a viable use, just not the
most viable use. It may also contend that even if the property
no longer serves the expansion purposes for which Brand X
acquired and held it, the land could be sold to someone else for
a lesser development and, thus, it still has some value. None-
theless, in a proper case, Brand X may well prevail.
The Washington State Supreme Court has once invali-
dated an ordinance on takings grounds in spite of the fact that,
on its face, it permitted some use to be made of every parcel of
land that it affected. In Allingham v. Seattle,5 3 the plaintiffs
challenged the City of Seattle's Greenbelt Ordinance, which
had been carefully drafted to ensure that a single family house
could physically be built on every lot."M Unfortunately, the
remainder of the lot had to be left in either permanent green-
belt or restored greenbelt, thereby eliminating the possibility
of normal yards, gardens, swing sets, RV storage, and other
accoutrements of middle-American residential life. 55 The
plaintiffs persuaded the trial court, and apparently the
supreme court, that in the middle-class, family neighborhoods
where the greenbelt properties occurred, the denial of the
right to have normal yards made the properties unacceptable
to the market and not economically viable for any other pur-
pose." The Supreme Court's language in affirming the trial
court was very broad and has since been limited by Presbytery
v. King County. 7 There is no reason to believe, however, that
the court would come to a different result on the same facts.
Thus, the court has already rejected the notion that an ordi-
153. 109 Wash. 2d 947, 749 P.2d 160 (1988), overruled in part on other grounds by
Presbytery of Seattle v. King County, 114 Wash. 2d 320, 787 P.2d 907 (1990).
154. The ordinance permitted a 1500 square foot area to be developed on a 5,000
square foot lot, and further permitted a 30 by 40 foot house and 200 square feet for a
driveway and sidewalks. On smaller lots, a variance could be granted to increase the
percentage of the lot which could be developed. See id. at 951, 749 P.2d at 163.
155. Id. at 952, 749 P.2d at 163.
156. See Trial Court Findings of Fact 23, 33, 54, 55, 57, Allingham (No. 52877-2);
Brief of Respondents, at 47-52, Allingham (No. 52877-2).
157. See Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 334-35, 787 P.2d 914-15.
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nance is insulated from a takings challenge so long as some
building can be placed on a parcel of land."5
Penn Central suggested that whether or not a taking
occurred should be determined in part by the extent to which
a regulation frustrated the owner's distinct investment-backed
expectations. 159 There, the court found no taking because the
purpose for which the property had been acquired-a train sta-
tion-remained a viable use. 60 If the court is going to use the
yardstick of the owner's reasonable investment-backed expec-
tations to measure regulations, it should not be with a one-way
stick. Where, as in this hypothetical, the owner's reasonable
and distinct investment-backed expectations have been
destroyed, the fact that some hypothetical use of some value
might be available to someone else should not necessarily
defeat a taking claim, particularly if even the alternative use is
largely speculative or only marginally viable.' 6 '
Cities seem to fear that allowing investors like Brand X,
who can prove that they have bought, held, and paid taxes on a
property intending to put it to a use identical to the use which
others similarly situated have been permitted, would suddenly
require them to compensate all landowners that speculatively
seek permission to develop in a manner that the city has never
158. The plaintiff in Presbytery argued that the sheer fact that it could not build
on the wetland or wetland buffers on its property was a taking of that portion of its
property, even though there was no proof that it could not build the church for which
it had purchased the property on the remainder. Id. at 325, 787 P.2d at 910. The
Supreme Court held that Allingham cannot be construed to go so far. Id. at 334, 787
P.2d at 914-15. The proof in Allingham went far beyond that in Presbytery, and there
is no suggestion that the court would not find a taking where the proof was, as
occurred in Allingham, that the taking of a portion rendered the entire property
valueless.
159. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104.
160. Id. at 136. See also Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 339, 787 P.2d at 917, where the
court was not so interested in the impact that the wetland regulation might have on a
subdivision of the property as it was in the county's affidavit that a church might be
permitted on the property.
161. Some case law would, however, indicate a contrary result. See MacDonald,
Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340 (1986) (156 unit subdivision on
currently agricultural land denied partially because of inadequate access and lack of
sewer service); Department of Natural Resources v. Thurston County, 92 Wash. 2d 656,
601 P.2d 494 (1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 830 (1980) (22 unit subdivision on 14 acre
parcel denied because of inadequate buffer of bald eagle nest). These courts have
refused to consider takings claims where a proposal was denied but a less dense project
might be approved. Cases in which an owner is not allowed to do as much as he
wanted, but is allowed to engage in a scaled-down project, is far different than cases in
which the owner is completely prevented from putting the property to the use for
which it was purchased.
Guidance for Growth
permitted. The Court in Penn Central, however, had greater
trust than that in the wisdom of trial judges. Penn Central's
focus on investment-backed expectations allows a trial court to
disregard "hopes" or "possibilities," such as Penn Central's
desire to build a multi-storied office tower cantilevered over
the building it built as a train station." 2 The Court's require-
ment that those expectations be "reasonable' 163 allows a trial
court to disregard expectations that might more properly be
described as "harebrained schemes." Under the principles of
Penn Central, trial judges are fully capable of determining
when property owners have a right to have expected that they
could put their property to a use for which they acquired it. In
this hypothetical, Brand X had reasonable expectations, and if
its property can no longer be used, it ought to be able to
recover just compensation.
What if Brand X is so pressed for expansion space that it
has no choice but to proceed with the minimal expansion that
would be allowed, even though the costs of the mitigation
requirements are so high that no one other than Brand X
would consider it a reasonable investment to buy Brand X's
property for any purpose, and Brand X proceeds solely because
it must have expansion space adjacent to its existing facility
and it already has invested in the property. Does Brand X
have any avenue of relief?
This case is more difficult, because the sheer fact that
Brand X proceeds with some development is powerful evi-
dence that the remaining use must have been viable. On the
other hand, if the facts are sufficiently egregious, there may
still be some hope for compensation. In Lucas, the Court held
open the prospect that there may be a case where a regulatory
taking occurs even though some slight remaining use exists.'64
But on a more promising front, a regulation or condition may
be invalid under the Due Process Clause because it is unduly
oppressive, even though some use of the property remains.
Assuming Brand X has enough stamina, it might be successful
in convincing a court on substantive due process grounds to
ease either the restrictions on its development or the mitiga-
tion requirements.
162. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
163. Id.
164. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894 n.7, 2895 n.8.
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III. CONCLUSION
These are but a few of the scenarios that will present con-
stitutional questions as cities and counties implement the
GMA. Wildlife corridors, steep slope restrictions and other
mapping issues are rife with the potential for undue burden
being placed on single property owners for the supposed bene-
fit of the entire community. In the most egregious cases, both
the prohibition against taking without just compensation and
the right to substantive due process will provide relief to
aggrieved property owners.
Many of the meritorious claims could be avoided if city
and county councils and planning staffs become more willing
to consider the actual impact of their regulations on individual
properties. Very often a regulation is not offensive as it applies
to most properties, but is entirely unreasonable as it applies to
a few."6 Too often in the past, public officials have been so
focused on the public benefit that they believe a regulation will
provide that they have not been willing to look closely at its
impact on specific properties. A greater sensitivity to specific
properties and a recognition that owners have protectable
rights, might lead to more decisions that protect the public
interest at stake without exposing the public to liability. These
protectable rights are at least the right to a viable use of their
land, as set forth in Lucas, to protection of distinct investment-
backed expectations, as set forth in Penn Central, to have the
sheer delay of processing permits and unreasonable demands
and excessive fees not destroy the viable use of their land, as
set forth in Sintra, and to substantive due process, as set forth
in Sintra, Robinson, and Lutheran Day Care. If public officials
recognize that a denial of these rights can lead to damages
being awarded against the public body, they may find more
sensitive and constructive resolutions to the conflict between
their desire to protect the public interest and a citizen's right
to be compensated for his or her property if it is taken in the
public interest.
The entire area also cries out for complete legislative revi-
sion or, at least, legislative improvement. Currently, the
165. Although it is not apparent in the Lucas decision, David Lucas' two lots were
the only two parcels rendered unbuildable by South Carolina's coastal regulations.
Interview with David Lucas in Spokane, Washington (Aug. 1992). One wonders what
purpose was served by South Carolina's failure to reach an accommodation with Lucas
by something short of litigation all the way to the United States Supreme Court.
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extent to which valid property rights claims can be eliminated
for all practical purposes by the burden of exhaustion of
administrative process is unconscionable. As the court so pre-
cisely stated in Parkridge v. Seattle: "The State Environmen-
tal Policy Act of 1971 and the other statutes and ordinances
administered by the building department serve legitimate func-
tions, none of which is intended for use by a governmental
agency to block the construction of projects, merely because
they are unpopular."'1 The legislature could, and should,
limit the time a public body can take and the costs it can
impose to decide whether a project can go forward. Con-
versely, individuals possessing property interests should be
willing to trade greater speed and certainty for some caps in
the potential damages that can be awarded against the public
body that is ultimately found to have gone too far. At the very
least, public bodies should have a greater opportunity to either
pay interim damages for a temporary taking and remove the
restriction or decide to buy the property at fair market value
and then resell it with whatever restrictive covenants the pub-
lic body deems appropriate. No one's legitimate interests are
served at present, where most injured parties cannot pass over
the pre-judicial hurdles necessary to bring a claim and where
cities and counties and their officials must live in fear of wind-
fall awards to an occasional survivor.
166. Parkridge v. Seattle, 89 Wash. 2d 454, 466, 573 P.2d 359, 366 (1978).
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